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COSTS IN CIVIL COURT PROCEEDINGS IN PENNSYLVANIA
By
D.

BARLOW BURKE*

Every lawyer who is actively engaged in the practice of law is constantly confronted with the ever present necessity of paying court costs, since it has long been
established that the expenses of litigation should be borne by the parties involved
rather than by the community at large. It is not the purpose of this discussion to consider the historical background that underlies this proposition though such a study
would make interesting reading and may be the subject of a future article by this
writer. It is rather my present purpose to review some of the legal and practical
problems with which the practitioner is faced in his day by day experiences in
courts of law and 'equity. It may safely be said that questions involving court costs
are perplexing to many lawyers, and while this article does not purport to be a
full and complete exposition of the subject, it is the writer's hope that it may answer
some of the questions that arise from time to time. In presuming to write on this
subject, I have made use of several years of experience as a taxing officer in the
courts of common pleas, during which time I have had to decide many questions
relating to costs in the course of litigation. No doubt the reader will think of many
situations that I have not attempted to cover and to him I can only say that neither
time nor space permits an all-inclusive discussion of such a wide subject. If I am
able to answer some of the questions which are in his mind and to stimulate him to
think of others, my purpose will have been accomplished.
We may start with the general proposition that the costs of a court case are to
be borne by the losing party, unless, as in equity proceedings, the court may direct
otherwise. There may, however, be times when the liability to pay costs is in dispute,
and the question then is presented as to who determines where such liability falls.
In arriving at an answer to this question, it should be borne in mind that in the
courts of common pleas of this Commonwealth the prothonotary is the officer
charged with the duty of taxing costs. The usual method of accomplishing such taxation is by having the party claiming costs file a bill in which the costs claimed are
itemized, to which bill his opponent may file exceptions. The prothonotary then
proceeds to a determination of the disputed questions raised by the bill and the exceptions thereto.1 But does such determination extend to a decision as to who is
liable to pay the costs of a particular case if this point is in dispute? There is
considerable authority to sustain the position that taxation of costs by the prothonotary is simply the ascertainment of items of costs due and that it does not decide the question of the party ultimately liable to pay the costs. In the case of Kirsch
*Principal Deputy Prothonotary, Courts of Common Pleas, Philadelphia. Member of Philadelphia Bar.
1 This procedure is usually fixed by rule of court. In Philadelphia it is governed by Common Pleas
Rule *308.
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v. Quiggle,2 it was held that it is the duty of the prothonotary to tax the costs which
may be due and it is the duty of the court to determine the liability and direct by
whom the costs should be paid. Furthermore, in the case of Burgess v. Senior s the
court said:
"If the objection is as to the legality of the taxation of any costs, the
proper procedure is to file the Bill of Costs, have them taxed by the prothonotary and then file a motion for a rule to show cause why a judgment
should not be entered thereon by the court."
There is, however, some authority to allow the prothonotary to proceed to a
determination of the question of liability for costs, subject to an appeal to the court
from his decision. In the case of Mahony, Trustee v. Boenning et al.,4 the prothonotary sustained the plaintiff's 'exceptions and refused to allow the defendant's bill
of costs on the ground that the defendant was the losing party. A similar result
was obtained in Tucker et al. v. Tucker et al.,5 where in the taxation of costs no
question was raised as to the accuracy of the plaintiff's bill but only as to their right
to costs. On appeal to the court of common pleas the prothonotary's action in allowing the plaintiff's bill was sustained.
Most frequently, however, the sole question before the taxing officer is the
correctness of the items of costs contained in the bill. At this point it should be
clearly understood that only those costs which are not already of record should be
included in a bill of costs. In other words, the purpose of the bill is to bring into
the record such of the party's costs as are not already there. Not infrequently, a
party, due to an insufficient understanding of the proper function of a bill of
costs will include therein items which are docket costs, such as the fee for filing
a pleading or issuing a writ or performing some service in connection with a case,
!he fee for which is set forth in the prothonotary's or sheriff's fee schedule, and
which is automatically of record as soon as the service has been performed. If, therefore, such items are also included and allowed in a party's bill the effect would be
to permit him to recover twice for the same item. 6
Before proceeding further in any discussion of costs it should be clearly understood that not every legitimate expense incurred in the conduct of a civil case is
included among the taxable costs. For a particular item to be taxed as part of the
costs of a case there must be clear statutory authority for so doing. 7 Therefore if an
item is not authorized by statute or by a rule of court based on a statute, (and
therefore having the 'effect of law), it is not a taxable cost. This principle is so well
established as to allow no argument, though there may be argument as to whether
an item in question is or is not authorized. The costs most frequently in dispute
are those pertaining to the charges of witnesses and in this field questions frequent2 57 Pa. 247 (1867).

8 54 D. & C. 167 (Pa. 1945).
4 139 Pa. Super. 428, 12 A.2d 483 (1940).
5 C.P. 5, Dec. 1948, No. 175 Phila.
6 C.P. 3, March 1953, No. 6268, Phila.; C.P. 5, June 1952, No. 6916, Phila.

7 Steele v. Lineberger, 72 Pa. 239 (1872).
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ly are raised as to whether or not the item sought to be recovered is based on a
statutory provision.
The Act of July 21, 19418 regulates the subject of witness fees and other
charges. In Section 1, the act defines the word "witness" as follows:
"... a witness subpoenaed to testify before (a) any court of records,
or (b) any department, board, commission or legislative body of the state
government or any municipality or (c) any officer or committee of, or
appointed by, any such court, department, board, commission, or legislative body."
The act proceeds in subsequent sections to fix the per diem compensation, mileage and lodging charges of witnesses in any proceeding and to provide that such
charges properly paid shall be taxable as costs therein.
It will be noted from the above that a witness is defined to be one who is
subpoenaed to appear. Should one who appears and testifies but is not under subpoena be considered as a witness within the meaning of the statute? In the recent
decision of Barton v. Johnson,9 the Mercer County Court decided this question
in the affirmative, but to this writer's knowledge, there is no appellate court decision which so states. In the case of Walker v. Pennsylvania Railroad,'0 the court
held that the defendant's witnesses, who were voluntarily in court, were not under
subpoena and had not been called and were not entitled to fees taxable as part
of the defendant's bill of costs. The case goes on to say that Section 7 of the Act of
194111 impliedly excludes witnesses who have not been subpoenaed and are not
called, although they are voluntarily present, under the rule of construction that
express mention of one thing impliedly excludes the other. This case did not consider the question answered in the affirmative by the Mercer County Court.
What is the situation regarding costs where a witness is subpoenaed to give
a deposition which is later to be used in the trial of a case? Is he a witness within
the meaning of Section 1 of the Act of 1941?72 In answering this question, numerous cases hold that such witnesses are constructively in attendance at court and are
entitled to the same fees as for actual court attendance.' 8
Where a witness is called by both parties to a proceeding is he entitled to receive a witness fee from both sides? In taxing the plaintiff's bill of costs submitted
4
in the case of Siravo v. PhiladelphiaTransportationCompany,' the writer refused
to allow such a charge by the plaintiff where the fee had already been paid by the
defendant and cited Section 3 of the Act of 1941 in support of his refusal. This
section reads:
"A witness necessarily present for more than one proceeding at the
same place during any day sfiall be paid but once for such period.'
8
9
10
11

P.L. 425, 28 P.S. 416. 1 et seq.
85 D. & C. 363 (Pa. 1953).
151 Pa. Super. 80, 29 A.2d 358 (1942).

"Witnesses who attend any proceeding under subpoena, but who are not called to testify therein,
shall receive the same compensation they would if actually called."
12 See ante p. 5.
18 Drumore Township Road, 22 Dist. R. 818 (Pa. 1913). Also see Wadlinger, Costs, p. 331.
14 Municipal Court, Oct. 1951, No. 923.
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It is believed that the foregoing language would sustain the defendant's objection to the plaintiff's charge.
It has many times been held that a party to a case may not collect fees for
his attendance as a witness in his own case. 15 This principle applies where the
party is a corporation as well as where he is an individual. In Slack Company v.
Stoner Thaw Company,"6 the court said:
"Why should a corporation be exempt from the rule that a party
may not collect fees for his attendance as a witness in his own case? The
corporation is a party and what may be said against an individual collecting witness fees in his own case may be argued with equal force against
a corporation."
This is especially true in those situations where the testimony offered is so
exclusively the testimony of the corporation as to make them virtually one and
the same. 7 For example, in a Philadelphia case, the identity of party and witness
was brought out in the following brief extract from the notes of testimony:
Q. You used to operate Jack Tratenberg, individual, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You are now Jack Tratenberg, Incorporated, is that correct?
A. Yes. I took over all the assets of the business and incorporated the
business about a year ago.18
The foregoing is not meant to say that an official of a corporation may
never be entitled to a witness fee when he is testifying on behalf of a corporate
party to a suit. He may be so entitled if his testimony is but a part of the corporation's entire case, and in this respect every situation must stand on its own merits.1 9
May the fee of an "expert" witness be taxed as part of the costs of a case?
While it is undoubtedly true that certain witnesses, on the basis of professional qualifications and the nature of the testimony they give, are properly entitled to receive
more than the fee fixed by the law, nevertheless the amount which may be included in the costs of the case cannot exceed the statutory provision. Under Section 2
of the Act of 1941, the amount fixed is as follows:
"Every witness shall be paid at the rate of $3.00 per day during
the necessary period of his attendance."
Therefore, until such time as the General Assembly may increase the amount, the
20
fee for a witness must remain at this sum as far as the taxable costs are concerned.
It is fundamental that no costs may be allowed except those authorized by
statute or rule of court based upon statutory authority. Ordinarily these items do
not include counsel fees. 2 ' An exception to this rule exists in the case of statutory
counsel fees, for example, counsel fees in sheriff's interpleader proceedings. Also,
15

Wadlinger, Law of Costs in Pennsylvania, p. 335.
16 2 D. & C. 387 (Pa. 1923).
17 Taxation of bill of costs, Lambert et al v.Durallum Products Corporation, Phila. C.P. 4, June,
1946, No. 4249.
18 Jack Tratenberg Inc. v. Louis Snyder, Phila. C.P. 1, June 1950, No. 6947.
19 See n. 17, supra.

20 Taxation of costs in case of John Abarelli et ux v. Philip Rosenberg, Phila. C.P. 2, Dec. 1947,
No. 3082.
21 Lower Yoder Township v. Title T and G Co., 318 Pa. 243, 178 Atl. 475 (1935).
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a rule of court may make an order, upon petition, allowing such fees to be included
among the costs. 22 But speaking generally, it may be said that counsel fees, im-

portant and necessary as they are, may not be considered as taxable costs.
A question often raised is whether the charges of a stenographer in taking
and transcribing depositions are taxable as costs. There is a split of authority on this
point. It is believed, however, that the better and prevailing view is that they are
not. In Hanna's Civil Practice Forms2 3 it is stated:
"No charge will be allowed for a stenographer for taking and transcribing depositions except by previous agreement of the parties."
Furthermore, Wadlinger's Law of Costs in Pennsylvania has this to say on
this point:
"There is no law providing for the payment of his (stenographer's)
services as costs of the proceedings and therefore they cannot be taxed as
such unless the parties so agree.
In the case of Smith v. Levy, 24 the court said:
"There is no statutory authority that we know of to support the
proposition that stenographer's charges are taxable as costs. No costs
can be claimed except such as are expressly allowed by some Act of Assembly."
25
A similar statement is to be found in the case of Adair v. Decker.
It may be noted at this point that there is limited authority for such charges
as provided by the following statute:
"Any official stenographer by the agreement of the parties to any
suit, action, or proceeding, or of their counsel, before any examiner,
master in chancery, special master, referee, commissioner, auditor or
other like officer, appointed by any of the said courts, in any suit, action or
proceeding therein pending may take, under the direction of any such
examiner... full stenographic notes of such proceedings.... The compenthe unsuccessful party as
sation for said services shall ...be paid by 26
costs in the cause, or as the court may direct."
This act has been interpreted as applying only to official stenographers em27
ployed by auditors, masters or others at hearings outside of court.
An interesting question that is raised from time to time concerns the right
28
of an attorney-at-law to claim a witness fee. In the case of McWilliams v. Hopkins,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in 1836, held that members of the bar are not
entitled to witness fees for attendance in a court in which they actually practice.
The reasoning behind this decision is that a lawyer normally is present in court
inthe course of his daily business, and, therefore, it is not prop'er for him to receive
Pennsylvania R.C.P. 409(d).
23 Vol. II, p. 1502.
24 10 Dist. R. 435 (Pa. 1901).
25 17 Dist. R. 614 (Pa. 1908).
26 Act of May 1, 1907, P.L. 135 § 9.
27 Kapp v. Kapp, 27 Dist. R. 1070 (Pa. 1918).
28 1 Wharton 276.
22
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compensation for services which he does not have to go out of his way to perform.
This reasoning may have been valid over one hundred years ago, especially in
rural or semi-rural communities, but under conditions existing today in a large
urban center such as Philadelphia, they simply do not prevail. Lawyers are not
"always present in court". In Philadelphia there are seven courts of common pleas,
a municipal court with several divisions, a court of quarter sessions, an orphans
court, a United States district court and circuit court of appeals, as well as a wide
variety of state, municipal and federal agencies before which attorneys are in frequent attendance. These courts are in simultaneous operation. It is hardly possible
of every attorney to be present every day in each court, although members of the
bar may be entitled to practice in 'each court. Also, the approximately 4,000 lawyers who are members of the Philadelphia bar have offices in all sections of the city,
many at a considerable distance from the courthouse. A decision based on conditions prevailing many years ago has lost most of its meaning and significance in
the present day. This writer so decided in dismissing an exception to a witness fee
of Bonetti v.
claimed for an attorney in the plaintiff's bill of costs in the case
29
Northwest Polish American Citizens Association of Philadelphia.
The rules of court in many counties provide for the filing of a party's bill
of costs within a certain fixed period. In Philadelphia, this period is four days,
in accordance with the following rule:
"When a cause is continued, tried or marked not reached, bills of
within four days after the continuance, trial or failure
costs must be filed
' '3 0
to be reached.

The time within which exceptions may be filed is also usually regulated by
rule of court, as for example, in Philadelphia, as follows:
"The party upon whom a bill of costs has been served may, within
four days after such service, file exceptions thereto and require that it be
taxed by the prothonotary. Failure to file exceptions within the said1four
days shall be deemed a waiver of all objections to the bill filed."'
Unless there is an agreement of the parties filed of record or an order of
court directing that the bill or the exceptions may be filed at a later date, or filed
8
nunc pro tunc, the prothonotary is bound by the letter of the rule. Relief, however, may be granted by the court in its discretion.
Under the rule as stated above, the bill must be filed within four days of
"trial". This sometimes raises the interesting question of what is meant by the word
"trial". Although it is difficult to find reported decisions precisely on the subject,
it is believed that the best tnd prevailing authority is to the effect that the trial is
on
concluded, not on the last day on which testimony is offered, but on the day
38
which the findings or verdict is rendered. In Hanna's Civil Practice Forms

said:
2 Phila. C.P. 4, Sept. 1951, No. 23 M.L.D.
80 Phila. C.P. Rule *308(b).
31 Phila. C.P. Rule *308(c).
32 Phila. C.P. 4, Sept. 1951, No. 23 M.L.D.
83 2 Hanna, Civil Practice Forms 1501.

it is
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"In Philadelphia, in cases of trial in the Municipal Court without a
jury, the Bill of Costs may be filed within four days after the findings of
the court are filed, as that is considered the last day of the trial within
the meaning of Rule 155 of the Courts of Common Pleas.","
It may be added that Rule 87 of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia is
essentially similar to the aforesaid common pleas rule.
There are several text references which tend to support this view. In Standard
Pennsylvania Practice3 5 appears the following statement:
"After the final determination of a cause, the party entitled to
costs files with the Prothonotary a written specification of the fees and
expenses which the rule requires his adversary to pay .... "
It would seem that the words "final determination" mean more than the closing of the evidence. Likewise, in Bouvitr's Law Dictionary,there is a discussion of
the meaning of the word "trial". It is said:
"The precise meaning of the word 'trial' has become material in
the construction of statutes regulating appeal or error costs, criminal procedure, voluntary non-suits, the removal of causes and official fees. The
word was held to be used not in its limited and restricted, but in its general
sense, including all the steps of a criminal case from its submission to the
court or jury to the rendering of the judgment." 8 6
Although the judgment referred to is a criminal one it is believed that the
quotation would be applicable equally to a civil cause.
No discussion of costs should be concluded without reference to the statutory
authority for costs on appeal to the Superior and Supreme Courts. This authority
may be cited as follows:
"In all cases either in law or equity, wherever an appeal is taken from
any judgment, decree, or order to the Supreme or the Superior Court, the
party in whose favor the final decision is rendered shall be entitled to
charge, and collect from the losing party as part of the costs, such amount
as shall have been expended for printing paperbooks upon said appeal.
The cost of printing the paperbook of each party shall be taxed as costs,
collectible by the attorney of record of such party in such appeal. Said
amount to be taxed and collected in the same manner as costs are now
taxed and collected by law." 87
The bill of costs covering the printing costs is to be filed in the lower court,
and if exceptions thereto are filed, the amount will be determined by the prothonotary.
In conclusion, the practitioner of law should always bear in mind the fundamental principle that of the many items of expense which he must meet in connection with the pr'esentation of his case, only those which are made so by law are
taxable as costs. Undoubtedly, there are numerous excluded items which might
properly be made taxable costs, but this is a matter for which the legislature must
provide the remedies.
84 Now Phila. C.P. Rule *308(b).
35 15 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 526.
86 Vol. III, p. 3321 et seq., (3rd rev. ed.).
87 Act of April 15, 1907 P.L. 83, § 1; Act of April 27, 1909, P.L. 263 § 1.

